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Abstract
Whereas  many authors  have  stated  that  the  failure  process  can  vary from one firm to another 
(Argenti, 1976; D'Aveni, 1989; Laitinen, 1991), relatively few researchers have searched to detect 
several  explanatory failure patterns, especially in small firms  (Haswell and Holmes, 1989). 
Out of a sample of 208 small distressed firms placed under follow-up by a Court of Commerce and 
by using simultaneously a cluster analysis and a correspondence analysis applied to data collected 
directly from these firms,  this  paper  identifies  a  taxonomy of five explanatory business  failure 
patterns,  i.e.  five  homogeneous  groups  of  small  firms  presenting  similarities  in  the  dominant 
reasons explaining  their failure. 
These five patterns may be respectively characterized as being dominated by shocked firms hurted 
by an abrupt event,  firms serving other interests than the pure societal ones,  apathetic firms that are 
no longer able to compete in a turbulent environment, firms that fail after a punctual managerial 
error and recurrently badly-managed firms. These results are consistent with previous literature and 
add-on a new insight on the understanding of the reasons explaining small business failure.
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Introduction
Previous research demonstrates that all the firms do not fail for the same reasons, that they do not 
follow the same failure process   and that they do not exit the failure process through the same exit 
(Argenti, 1976; Newton, 1985 ; D'Aveni, 1989; Laitinen, 1991). 
Nevertheless,  to  date,  relatively  few  researchers  have  worked  specifically  on  the  detection  of 
business  failure  patterns  and/or  the  identification  of  taxonomies  explaining  why firms  fail.  An 
extensive review of the thirteen studies of this topic identified after an extensive review of the 
literature highligts two main conclusions  (Crutzen and Van Caillie, 2008; Crutzen, 2009) :
1. Two main categories of failure patterns are present in the literature :  
 Researchers such as Argenti (1976), Miller (1977), Malecot (1981) or Moulton et al. 
(1996) present several explanatory business failure patterns (EBFPs) : they propose a 
series of homogeneous sets of characteristics, traits or factors that explain the failure of 
firms. 
 Researchers like D'Aveni (1989), Laitinen (1991) or Van Wymeersch and Wolfs (1996) 
identify several  subsequent (or even symptomatic) business failure patterns :  they 
underline  distinctive  homogeneous  sets  of  organizational  or  financial  failure 
consequences that characterize failing firms. In that perspective D'Aveni (1989) presents 
three consecutive failure patterns that precede bankruptcy, i.e. sudden decline, gradual 
decline and lingering, and Laitinen (1991) proposes three distinctive financial (and thus 
symptomatic) failure paths. 
2.  Whereas  a  particular  attention  has  to  be  paid  to  small  business  failures  because  they  are 
numerous and particular (see Paper 2), none of the reviewed research really focuses on small firms. 
The existing studies are thus either general (Malecot, 1981; Masuch, 1985) or they focus on large 
firms (D'Aveni, 1989; Miller, 1992; Moulton et al., 1996). However, it is obvious that particular 
EBFPs should be recognized in function of the specific characteristics of small businesses.
After  examining previous  literature,  the present  study gathers empirical  evidence on distinctive 
explanatory business failure patterns amongst small firms. 
On the basis of two complementary statistical analyses (Thiétart, 2003), this paper identifies, among 
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a sample of 208 small distressed firms, a taxonomy of five EBFPs, i.e. five homogeneous groups of 
small firms on the basis of the reasons for their failure. 
The present paper is organized into four main sections. 
The first section briefly summarizes the results of previous research on explanatory business failure 
patterns. The second section describes the methodology used to elaborate the taxonomy : the sample 
of distressed firms, the data collection and the data analysis methods used in the present research 
are presented. In the third section, the results of the statistical analysis are presented. Finally, the 
fourth section proposes a discussion of the results.
1. Literature review
An extensive review of the literature on business failure prevention points out thirteen studies that 
propose a series of distinctive business failure patterns (Crutzen, 2009). Eight of these preventive 
studies focus on the identification of distinctive  explanatory business failure patterns (EBFPs). 
Nevertheless, none of them concentrates on small firms : these studies are either general or they 
focus on large business failures (Miller, 1992; Moulton et al., 1996). 
By considering their intrinsic characteristics (Julien et al., 2005), Table 1 summarizes the findings 
of these previous studies that appear to be transferable to small firms1. On the basis of these studies, 
this table highlights the five typical patterns which could explain small business failures.
1 For example  the study of Miller (1992),  which was only dedicated to large firms, was not included in this 
summary.
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Table 1 : Summary of the patterns emerging from previous literature
2 As they are dedicated to large firms or to the consequences of failure, the other two patterns presented by Miller 
(1977) can not be used to explain small firms' failure
3 Idem 
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To conclude this first section, on the basis of previous literature, we have identified five patterns 
which could explain small business failures. These are : 
1. Poor performing firms that never succeed
2. (Young) firms that fail after a rapid expansion
3. (Older) firms that fail after expansion
4. Firms that fail after an external event
5. Firms that have not adapted (adequately) to their (changing) environment 
With reference to the principles of the abductive reasoning (Thiétart, 2003), we are now going to 
induce EBFPs from the ground. We will then compare our empirical results to these five typical 
patterns, which emerge from previous literature. Finally, we will have the opportunity to determine 
if  our  empirical  findings  are  consistent  with  previous  research  and  if  they  provide  some  new 
interesting insights regarding EBFPs amongst small firms.
2. Methodology
2.1. Sample of distressed firms
The present research tends to determine the reasons for the failure of a sample of distressed firms 
and to organize this information into several distinctive EBFPs, dedicated to small businesses. With 
reference to the model proposed by Crutzen and Van Caillie (2008) this study considers a sample of 
firms situated in the second or in third stage of the failure process, i.e. distressed firms, and it goes 
back to the origins of their failure, i.e. the first stage of the process.
It is worth noticing that the selection of a (large) sample of distressed firms and the gathering of 
information about the reasons for their failure are real challenges. 
On the one hand, it is difficult to isolate a population (and then a sample) of distressed firms that are 
different from bankrupt or death firms (Haswell and Holmes, 1989). Indeed, it is possible to observe 
legal bankruptcies from Court records with reasonable accuracy but it is much more difficult to 
isolate distressed firms on the basis of less precise criteria such as the default payment criterion 
(Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1988; Haswell and Holmes, 1989). Nevertheless, we are convinced that 
restricting the present research to an analysis of death or bankrupt firms would provide a biased or a 
narrow view of business failure (causes). Indeed, mortality is not necessarily linked with failure 
(Keasey and Watson, 1991) and bankruptcy is only one potential exit of the failure process . Some 
distressed firms do not go bankrupt and it  is useful to identify the reasons for their  failure.  In 
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addition, even if bankrupt firms are easily identifiable (thanks to official and public data), it is very 
difficult to contact the entrepreneur of these firms in order to get information about the causes of 
their failure.
On the other hand, once a population of distressed firms has been identified and delimited, it is 
difficult to contact their leaders and to get information about the fundamental causes of their failure. 
Failure  is  a  very sensitive topic  (Ooghe and De Prijcker,  2008) and individuals  have a natural 
reticence to discuss failure and its causes (Bruno et al., 1987). In this sense, Bruno et al. (1987) 
underline two main difficulties : the unwillingness of certain entrepreneurs to discuss failure and the 
inability of some of them to objectively detect its causes. Furthermore, if the firm is still operating, 
the leaders usually have little time and no interest to work with scientists : their concern is survival 
(Weitzel and Jonsson, 1989)
Under these conditions, the partnership between the University4 and the Court of Commerce of 
Liège (Belgium) on which the present study is based has two main advantages5. 
 The distressed firms are identified beforehand by the Court : a population of distressed firms 
is thus clearly delimited, i.e. distressed firms placed under investigation by the Court. 
 The leaders  of the distressed firms are invited by a  legal  authority to speak about their 
failure. It is therefore much easier to obtain information about explanatory failure factors 
than to try to collect these data without any official legitimacy.
In  order  to  ensure  the  diversity  of  the  data,  three  types  of  files  from the  Court  (Commercial 
Inquiries, Legal Reorganizations and Bankruptcies) are analyzed in the present research.
At first,  106 distressed firms convoked to a Commercial Inquiry by the Commercial Inquiry 
Department are considered in the sample. These firms were convoked to a Commercial Inquiry, 
and were thus included in the sample, on the basis of the following criteria (Bayard and Lonhienne, 
2003) :
First,  they  were  detected  and  then  considered  as  distressed  firms  by  the  Commercial  Inquiry 
Department on the basis of predetermined failure signals.  These are  protests, judgments against 
thedebtor, payment defaults to the social security administration or to the tax administration (VAT, 
Income tax) for at least 2 trimesters, any decisions of suspension or withdrawal of a procurement 
contractor’s certification and any pertinent information from the annual accounts or from a report 
4 In particular, the Research Center on Business Performance from HEC-Ecole de Gestion de l'Université de Liège
5 Of course, this partnership with the Court of Commerce of Liège provides us with an access to a unique database 
that opens extensive potential for qualitative and quantitative research.
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filled by the controller of the firm's accounts. The combination of criteria retained to consider a firm 
as a distressed firm varies from one Court to another. Generally, a newly founded firm is considered 
as distressed as soon as ONE negative signal is collected. Otherwise, it is the combination of several 
negative signals that leads to the opening of a specific file.  
Second,  after  the  collection  of  additional  information  about  this  firm and after  a  first  analysis 
realized by the administrative department, it comes out that the signals are relevant and significant, 
so that the Chamber of Commercial Inquiry6 can analyze it.
Finally, the judges from the Chamber of Commercial Inquiry estimate it is necessary to convoke the 
leader(s) of the distressed firm to a Commercial Inquiry, i.e. a meeting between a (consular) judge 
and the leader(s) of the detected distressed firms, in order to investigate the problems of the firm 
further. During this meeting, questions about the “perceived” causes of the distress of the firm, the 
current situation of the firm and the measures intended to remedy the situation are asked.
In order to limit the bias linked to the selection procedure explained just before and, thus, in order 
to make sure that the present research does not focus on particular distressed firms7, the sample 
includes two other kinds of distressed firms : 51 bankrupt firms and 51 firms that entered a legal 
reorganization procedure.8
Nevertheless, as business failure is a downward spiral, a distressed firm convoked to a commercial 
inquiry can become a reorganizing firm and even, then, a bankrupt firm in the later stages of the 
failure  process  if  no  corrective  actions  are  implemented  in  order  to  recover  (Crutzen and Van 
Caillie, 2008). It is thus important to distinguish between the type of files the sampled firms come 
from, i.e. the source (Commercial Inquiry, Bankruptcy or Legal Reorganization files) they come 
from at the time they are analyzed by the researcher, and the exit of their failure process. As Figure 
1 shows, the final exit of a failure process is always characterized either by the recovery of the firm 
6 This official meeting between judges from the Court of Commerce is presided by a professional judge who is 
assisted by 2 consular judges. : they analyze the situation of the detected distressed firms and they can make three 
distinctive decisions : to close the file if they consider that the firm's continuity is not in peril, to organize a 
Commercial Inquiry if further investigation is necessary or to engaged into a bankruptcy procedure if the conditions 
for it are fulfilled.
7 For example, a selection bias could derive from the fact that the (consular) judges may have a natural tendency to 
select (for a Commercial Inquiry) firms that are particularly important for the development of their Region (firms 
from specific sectors for example).
8 It is worth mentioning that, as the Commercial Inquiry Department has a preventive mission, firms detected by this 
Department should be earlier in the failure process (as described in Papers 1 and 2), and their situation should thus 
be less deteriorated, than other kinds of distressed firms, i.e. bankrupt firms or legal reorganizations. Therefore, they 
should have much more opportunities to recover. In the same spirit, the (organizational and financial) situation of 
firms that entered a legal reorganization procedure should normally be  less deteriorated than the one of bankrupt 
firms. Thus, as it does not only analyze bankrupt firms, this research proposes a relatively broad range of EBFPs that 
does not solely include “patterns that conduct to bankruptcy”.
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or by its disappearance (through bankruptcy, liquidation, etc.).
Figure 1 : The distress process and its output
The sample of firms on which this research is based is then composed of 208 incorporated9 small 
Belgian distressed firms investigated by the Court of Commerce of Liège for a Commercial Inquiry, 
a Legal Reorganization or a Bankruptcy. 
Tables 2  and 3 describe the sample on the basis of some objective characteristics (age,  size10, 
capital and industry). 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, skewness of variables) 
about  the  sampled  firms  by  type  of  file  (Commercial  Inquiry,  Legal  Reorganization  and 
Bankruptcy), in function of their age and size.
9 Firms that have a juridical identity that is different from the owner's.
10 The size of the firms is determined by the number of workers. Regarding the European Commission Definition 












Table 2 : Characteristics of the sample by type of file
In addition, Table 3 shows the distribution of the Sample by Type of files and by Industry11.
Table 3 : Distribution of the Sample by Type of files and by Industry
2.2. Data collection
For each of the three types of distressed firms mentioned above, information about the intrinsic 
characteristics  of  these  firms  (age,  size,  life  cycle)  and  of  their  leaders  as  well  as  about  the 
11 HORECA is the French abbreviation for the Industry grouping Hotels, Restaurants and Cafés
9
Commercial Inquiry Legal Reorganization Bankruptcy TOTAL
Manufacture 16 8 3 27
7,69% 3,85% 1,44% 12,98%
Construction 17 11 10 38
8,17% 5,29% 4,81% 18,27%
Services 24 11 10 45
11,54% 5,29% 4,81% 21,63%
Commerce 33 15 17 65
15,87% 7,21% 8,17% 31,25%
HORECA 16 6 11 33
7,69% 2,88% 5,29% 15,87%
TOTAL 106 51 51 208
50,96% 24,52% 24,52%
Characteristics Commercial Inquiry Legal Reorganization Bankruptcy
AGE
Mean 10,7 8,1 7,53
Median 7,00 5,00 6,00
Minimum 0,0000 0,000 1,0000
Maximum 44 32 19,0
Standard Deviation 9,6 7,8 5,45
Skewness 1,036342 1,521007 0,619224
SIZE (Personnel)
Mean 6,4 8,4 3,00
Median 4,00 4,00 2,00
Minimum 0,0000 0,000 0,0000
Maximum 50 48 13,0
Standard Deviation 7,7 11,0 3,29
Skewness 3,130028 2,236837 1,428634
EQUITY (in euros)
Mean 119606,7 140986,0 31498,02
Median 20000,00 25000,00 18600,00
Minimum 250,0000 2500,000 250,0000
Maximum 4713835 1240000 308000,0
Standard Deviation 488428,7 263005,8 45635,97
Skewness 8,712899 2,689161 5,002780
fundamental  reasons  for  their  failure  was  gathered.  In  order  to  ensure  the  reliability  and  the 
homogeneity of the data collection, systematic collection grids were elaborated for each kind of 
files  (Commercial  Inquiry,  Bankruptcy  and  Legal  Reorganization),  on  the  basis  of  the  model 
proposed by Crutzen and Van Caillie (2008).
Different data collection methods were used in function of the type of distressed firms. 
Concerning the firms convoked to a Commercial Inquiry, the data collection process consists in the 
observation of the meeting between the judge and the leader(s) of the distressed firms. 
 Before each meeting, the file was analyzed by the scientific researcher and by the consular 
judge :  pertinent  information was already drawn from the diverse documents  which the 
Department disposed of (financial annual accounts, possible answer of the entrepreneur to a 
questionnaire, failure symptoms identified, etc.). 
 Then, the meeting took place and the judge asked questions to the entrepreneur regarding 
the  failure  of  his  firm and the  reasons  for  this  situation.  Sometimes,  depending on  the 
personality of the judge, the researcher had the opportunity to ask some questions. 
 Finally,  after  the  meeting,  the  information  collected  was  discussed  with  the  judge 
(feedback). 
Concerning  the  other  two  kinds  of  distressed  firms,  the  data  collection  process  consists  in  a 
documentary analysis : the analysis of bankruptcy and legal reorganization (court) records. These 
documents have to be written by the (bankruptcy or legal reorganization) administrators and they 
contain crucial information about the firm's characteristics and about the fundamental factors that 
explain its failure.
Beside this collection of data at the Court of Commerce, the annual financial statements of each of 
the sampled firms were collected, when they were available, via a software called “Belfirst”. This 
latter is a database that gathers together the published financial statements of incorporated firms 
located in Belgium and in Luxembourg. 12
In order to make sure that the failure of the studied firms is not related to particular environmental 
conditions13, the data include distressed firms investigated by the Court at different periods of time. 
First,  data about distressed firms convoked to a Commercial Inquiry were collected during two 
12 Actually, the data collected at the Court can be affected by the subjectivity of the interviewed leaders, of the 
(consular) judges or administrators in charge of the file and of the researcher who gathers the data. A supplementary 
examination of each firm's financial statements in order to confront and confirm the data collected seems us 
particularly judicious. This is what Yin (1988) refers to when he speaks about the triangulation of the data, i.e. 
comparison of data obtained from different sources.
13 What would lead to bias in the identification of distinctive EBFPs
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distinctive time periods : 
 Data about the first 50 cases were collected between September and December 2006. An 
exploratory analysis of this first 50 firms was then rapidly carried out in order to obtain 
some exploratory results.
 Information about the remaining 56 cases were collected between January and June 2008.
Second, data about bankrupt firms refer to firms that were declared bankrupt between September 
2007  and  January  200814 :  the  first  ten15 incorporated  firms  that  were  declared  bankrupt  in 
September, October, November, December 2007 and January 2008 are included in the sample.
Finally, information was gathered about firms that entered a legal reorganization procedure between 
1998 and 2004.
As a lot  of qualitative variables compose the database,  a code (a number) was assigned to the 
answers  so  that  the  responses  could  be  grouped into  a  limited  number  of  classes16.  When  the 
modalities of the qualitative variables could be sorted, discrete ordinal data were assigned to these 
variables. In many other cases, discrete nominal data were assigned to the variables. The classifying 
of the qualitative data into limited categories sacrificed some data details but it was necessary for an 
efficient statistical analysis (Cooper and Schindler, 2000). 
2.3. Statistical analysis
First, a cluster analysis of cases (Everitt, 1974; Statsoft, 1995b, Bouroche and Saporta, 2005) was 
carried out in order to determine homogeneous groups of small firms according to the collected 
characteristics  that  explain  their  failure17.  In  the  present  study,  this  non  parametric  statistical 
analysis aims at grouping together cases (i.e. small distressed firms) that are the most similar to 
each others when a series of variables are considered (i.e. characteristics that fundamentally explain 
their failure). 
14 The juridical year is similar to the academic year in Belgium (from September until June)
15 The President of the Court confirms us that the first ten bankruptcies of each month are not selected according to a 
procedure which differs from the one used to select the other bankruptcies of the month. The chronological sequence 
of bankruptcies which are pronounced by the Court of Commerce of Liège only depends on the date on which the 
entrepreneur makes a confession of bankruptcy or on the date on which the creditors officially ask the Court of 
Commerce to pronounce the firm bankrupt. The chronological sequence of bankruptcies which are pronounced each 
month is thus completely random.
16 Of course, a code was only attributed to variables which were directly included in the following statistical analyses 
17 Remember that the term cluster analysis (first used by Tryon, 1939) encompasses a number of different algorithms 
and methods allowing to group objects into categories. This data analysis technique aims at sorting different objects 
into groups in a way that the degree of association between two objects is maximal if they belong to the same group 
and minimal otherwise. So, a cluster analysis discovers structures in data but does not explain why they exist.
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The cluster analysis we carried out had the following characteristics :
 The distance measure used to amalgamate cases is (1 – Pearson r) or (1- correlation) : the 
more important the correlation between two cases, the more reduced the distance between 
these two cases. 
 The amalgamation rule chosen to amalgamate clusters is the Ward’s (1963) criterion (the 
nearest  clusters  are  associated  at  each  step).  This  method  uses  an  analysis  of  variance 
approach  to  evaluate  the  distances  between  clusters.  In  short,  this  method  attempts  to 
minimize the Sum of Squares (SS) of any two (hypothetical) clusters that can be formed at 
each step (Statsoft, 1995b).
 On the basis of the choice of a relevant linkage distance, several  clusters, i.e. homogeneous 
groups of firms, in function of the conditions which fundamentally explain their failure, are 
finally retained .
Second,  a  correspondence  analysis  (Benzécri,  1973;  Lebart  et  al.,  1977;  Lebart  et  al.,  1984; 
Greenacre,  1984;  Bouroche  and  Saporta,  2005)  was  carried  out  in  order  to  determine  which 
modalities of the active variables (considered as dependent variables, i.e. characteristics that explain 
the failure) are related to each cluster, the taxonomy being considered as a passive variable in the 
analysis (i.e. a variable that has to be explained by the different modalities of the active variables, 
without  any  interference  with  them).  This  statistical  analysis  is  traditionally  considered  as 
complementary to the cluster analysis and as the privileged method to describe qualitative variables 
(Bouroche and Saporta, 2005) : it helps thus to explain the nature and the determinants of each 
cluster (or EBFPs) 18. 
3. Results
3.1. A preliminary observation
Exploratory statistical analyses ( Crutzen, 2009) showed that the five (emerging) innovative firms 
that compose the sample are really different from other ones when analyzing the reasons for their 
18 This non-parametric multivariate data analysis technique allows to highlight the proximities between the modalities 
of discrete variables considered as active (i.e. explaining a phenomenon) and the modalities of discrete variables 
considered as passive (i.e. explained and dependent from the active variables). The results of this analysis are multi-
dimensional graphs, allowing to understand the proximities between modalities of some variables and allowing to 
reduce the information contained in a database into some synthetic dimensions. The results provide information 
which is similar in nature to those produced by a Factor Analysis (Statsoft, 1995b). The mathematical model 
underlying to this technique is similar in its principles to the one used in a principal components analysis but is 
adapted to the very nature of the data which are transformed (these data being ordinal and not continuous).
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failure. 
According  to  previous  analysis  made  by  Crutzen (2009),  these  innovative19 firms  are  lead  by 
passionate  entrepreneurs  who concentrate  on  the  development  of  their  technology and of  their 
product rather than on their commercialization and, to a larger extend, on the management of the 
business. As they are less interested in the commercial aspects of business, they have difficulties to 
find customers and to sell their product. Furthermore, they lack skills in finance, in accounting and 
in business administration. As Bruno et al. (1987) argue, they are “technology- or product-oriented” 
rather than “business-oriented”. 
Under these conditions,  these particular firms should be considered separately and analyzed in-
depth. 
So,  the present study concentrates intentionally on the other firms and on the reasons for their 
failure. In a second step, the statistical analyses presented in the methodology section were thus 
applied to a final sample of 203 distressed firms, once outliers were identified and deleted (208 
minus 5 innovative firms). 
3.2. The identification of five  main EBFPs 
3.2.1. The results of the cluster analysis
After a Cluster Analysis of the 203 remaining cases, five clusters (or homogeneous groups of small 
firms in function of the characteristics that fundamentally explain their failure, or EBFPs) were 
retained at a linkage distance of 5.5 ( Figure 2 and 3)20. 
19 Often High Technology firms 
20 We could have chosen for 6 clusters at a linkage distance of 5.08. Nevertheless, a deep analysis of Figure 2, 
completed by a correspondence analysis, shows that, at this distance, the cluster analysis splits the shocked firms 
between firms that are shocked by pure external factors and firms that are shocked by human-related problems (in 
direct relationship with the firm's life or not). We consider thus that this choice would have had as a consequence the 
identification of over-specific groups : two sub-patterns.
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Figure 2 : The amalgamation tree resulting from the cluster analysis – 203 firms
Figure 3 : Plot of linkage distances across steps – 203 firms
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Tree Diagram for 203 Cases
Ward`s method
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3.2.2. The results of the correspondence analysis
Regarding the plot of eigenvalues (Figure 4), the number of dimensions under consideration in the 
present study was restricted to 2 because the third dimension did not have any significant additional 
explanatory power. 
Figure 4 : Plot of eigenvalues associated with the dimensions considered by the correspondence analysis – 203 firms
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Plot of Eigenvalues
Input Table (Rows x Columns): 127 x 127
Total Inertia=1,2281




















Figure 5: Results of the correspondence analysis (2D Graph) – 203 firms
2D Plot of Column Coordinates; Dimension:  1 x  2
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Figure 5  represents on a 2D graph the results of the correspondence analysis. 
In order to interpret these results, Appendix 1 presents the variables which are the most correlated to 
each of the two dimensions considered and the column coordinates of the different modalities of the 
variables (all neutral coordinates being discarded due to the fact they do not bring any additional 
information) on Dimension 1 and on Dimension 2. 
From Appendix 1, it comes out that : 
 Dimension  1  opposes  endogenous  (or  internal21)  and  exogenous  (or  external22) 
explanatory failure factors23. 
On the  left  side,  this  first  dimension is  strongly associated  to  pure internal  explanatory failure 
factors, which are related to an internal deficient management of the firm's resources  and of their 
deployment, such as a deficient business organization, administration or finance. 
On the right side, Dimension 1 is strongly associated to pure external explanatory failure factors, 
which are independent from deficiencies in the resources of the firm and in their deployment, such 
as pressures or shocks coming from the competitive environment of the firm.
 Dimension 2 refers to the firm's ability to adapt to its environment :  it relates to the 
ability of  the firm to anticipate  changes  in  its  environment  and,  then,  to  adapt  to  these 
changes. Indeed, the variables which are the most correlated to this second dimension are 
the firm's ability to invest, to innovate, to anticipate changes and to adapt to them as well as 
the firm's strategy. 
Appendix 1 shows that, from the top until the bottom, Dimension 2 successively relates to
 An  inability to innovate (MR-Inno:2) and to adapt to the environment (CG-Adapt:2) 
because of a lack of motivation and of commitment to the firm (EE-Eng:2).
 An inadequate anticipation of the future (CG-Ant:2) that leads to problems of adaptation 
to the environment such as to an inadequate business plan (CG-BP:2)  or to a wrong 
investment (MR-Inv:2).
 An ability to anticipate and to adapt to the environment, which is not significant   when 
considering the origins of the business failure.
 An adequate  anticipation of events (CG-Ant:0) that leads to an adequate adaptation to 
the environment : adequate strategy and investment policy (MR-Inv:0; MR-Strat:0)
21 Coming from within the firm
22 Originated from outside the firm
23 As differentiated by Ooghe and Waeyaert (2004) for example
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 A perfect adaptation (alignment) between the firm and its environment thanks to a ability 
to  innovate  (CG-R&D:-2;  CG-Inno:2),  to  the  motivation  (EE-Motiv:-2) and  to  the 
commitment of the leaders to their firm (EE-Eng:-2).
It is worth noticing that Figure 5 exhibits what is called a horseshoe-shaped curve or a Guttman 
effect (1968) : the modalities of the variables under consideration exhibit an inversed U-Shape. This 
means  that  most  of  the  information  is  contained  in  Dimension  1  and  that  there  are  some 
redundancies between the two dimensions under consideration24.  
On the one hand, the plot of eigenvalue (Figure 4) confirms that dimension 1 has a very high 
explanatory power (eigenvalue = 0.18) compared to dimension 2 (eigenvalue = 0.08). 
On the other hand, as mentioned before, the first dimension opposes firms with extreme behaviors 
in terms of reasons for failure : firms that fail because of  endogenous factors and firm that fail 
because of exogenous factors. The second dimension relates to the firm's ability to adapt to its 
environment, depending on its resources and on their deployment . With reference to the Guttman 
effect (1968) presented above, this second dimension is not independent from Dimension 1 and it 
can even be related to it. Indeed, the firm's ability to adapt to its environment is the result of a mix 
of endogenous and exogenous factors : it relates to the internal management of external factors. In 
other words, it determines the connection between internal resources and capabilities and external 
strategic factors (Thornhill and Amit, 2003).
This second dimension opposes thus firms with an intermediary behavior (firms which fail because 
of  a  mix  of  endogenous  and  exogenous  factors  and  which  are  thus  unable  to  adapt  to  their 
environment) to firms with an extreme behavior (firms which are able to adapt (adequately) to their 
environment). We make thus the assumption that this second dimension opposes apathetic small 
firms (EBFP 3) to non-failing (sound) firms that are aligned with their environment. As the present 
study only concentrates on failing firms, it is then logical that the section of the graph that refers to 
sound firms is empty. 
A precise analysis of the 2D graph (Figure 5) and an examination of the various points dispatched 
on it (Appendix 1) lead to a better understanding of each EBFP.
First,  EBFP 1 (41 firms) refers to shocked firms, i.e.  small  firms that fail after one or several 
shocks.  Indeed,  the  correspondence  analysis  associates  the  following  problems  with  EBFP 1  : 
24 Even if it does not add as much explanatory power as dimension 1, we consider that dimension 2 has nevertheless 
to be retained because it provides some interesting precisions about the various clusters (or EBFPs). 
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private problems, external shocks from the macroeconomic or from the competitive environment, 
problems related with the takeover of the firm and disagreements between key actors. Two main 
categories of shocked firms may thus be distinguished . 
 Small  firms  that  are  shocked  by  (pure)  external  shocks  such  as  pressures  from  their 
macroeconomic or competitive environments and accidental shocks. 
 Small firms that are knocked by human-related shocks, which are in relationship with the 
firm's  life  or  not.  Succession  problems,  disagreement(s)  between  key  actors  or  private 
problems are examples of human-related shocks. 
Second,  EBFP 2 (20 firms)  relates to  firms that serve other interests,  i.e.  small  firms  whose 
operations  mainly  serve  other  interests  than  their  own  ones.  In  these  firms,  the  (personal  or 
professional) objectives of the entrepreneurs are, consciously or unconsciously, not aligned with the 
corporate  goals.  The predominance of the entrepreneur's  personal  interests  over  the firm's  ones 
(such  as  a  disproportionate  amount  of  shareholders'  receivables)  and  fraudulent  activities  are 
strongly associated with EBFP 2.
Referring to the first two clusters, unsurprisingly, the correspondence analysis shows that they are 
neither related to a particular life cycle nor to particular deficiencies in managerial competences, 
which are considered as endogenous failure factors. 
Third,  EBFP 3 (15 firms)  concerns apathetic,  nonreactive small  firms (often in the phase of 
maturity/decline) which  become  progressively misaligned  with  their  environment  because  their 
leaders  lack  the  ability  to  anticipate  events  and  to  adapt  to  (progressive)  changes.  The  main 
fundamental reasons for their progressive misalignment with their external environment is the lack 
of dynamism and the loss of motivation of their leaders. Indeed, the correspondence analysis relates 
this cluster to the maturity/decline phase of the life cycle, to a poor level of innovation, to a poor 
ability to anticipate and to adapt to changes, to a poor commitment and to a poor motivation of the 
leaders.
Fourth,  EBFP 4 (36 firms) is not clearly explained by the results of the correspondence analysis. 
Actually,  any  significant  relationship  between the  modalities  of  the  active  variables  and  this 
modality of the passive variable (EBFP = 4) comes clearly out of the correspondence analysis25. 
25 Under these conditions, a further investigation of this EBFP (in a future research) is necessary for its complete 
understanding
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However,  it  comes out that,  a priori,  EBFP 4 refers to firms that fail  because of a punctual 
managerial error. This latter is related to the (in)ability of the entrepreneur to correctly analyze the 
firm's environment, to anticipate changes and to adapt the firm to it. Indeed, this fourth EBFP is 
strongly associated with firms that fail because of on an inadequate business plan or because of a 
managerial decision that does not have the expected consequences. 
Fifth,  EBFP 5 (91 firms)  relates to badly-managed firms. This failure pattern gathers together 
firms  that  are  generally  situated  in  the  first  stages  of  their  life  cycle  and  that  are  run  by 
entrepreneurs with insufficient managerial competences. This fifth EBFP is very large because it 
includes  firms  that  suffer  from  all  kinds  of  problematic  managerial  competences  :  the 
correspondence analysis associates it with poor competences in marketing, in operations, in finance, 
in business administration, etc. 
Nevertheless, this failure pattern should be investigated further for the following reasons. 
 It includes 91 firms of the sample and it is thus, by far, the most common failure pattern 
identified by the present analysis. 
 The explanation provided thanks to the results of the correspondence analysis is vague and it 
requires much more precision.  Indeed,  this  fifth  EBFP gathers  together  a  wide array of 
badly-managed firms : it includes motivated as well as unmotivated entrepreneurs, it refers 
to firm in which problems of control are detected or to firms confronted to commercial 
deficiencies, etc. 
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Figure 6: Five major EBFPs
As explained before, two fundamental dimensions explain the failure of small firms. FirstFirst, the 
endogenous versus exogenous nature of the explanatory failure factors. Second, the firm's ability to 
adapt to its environment.  Considering these two fundamental  dimensions, five main EBFPs are 
identified by the present analysis and they are positioned on the layout. 
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First, the reasons for the failure of shocked firms (EBFP 1) and of firms that serve other interests 
(EBFP 2) are exogenous to the firm's set of resources and are not particularly linked with the firm's 
ability to adapt to its environment (a shock = a sudden event)26.
Second,  the  failure  of  apathetic  firms (EBFP 3)  is  explained  by  a  mix  of  endogenous  and 
exogenous factors. In these firms, the entrepreneurs cannot sustain the connection between internal 
resources and capabilities and external strategic factors (Thornhill and Amit, 2003). Subsequently, 
they fail  because  there  is  no internal  management  of  external  factors  (such  as  changes  in  the 
environment). The position of this third EBFP on the second dimension shows that this situation 
results from the firm's lack of ability to adapt to its environment, i.e. its inertia.
Third, the failure of firms belonging to EBFP 4 is also related to a mix of external and internal 
factors and, in particular, to an (punctual) inadequate internal management of external factors which 
conducts the entrepreneur to make a  punctual managerial error. This fourth EBFP is positioned 
lower on the second dimension than EBFP 3. This means that, while EBFP 3 relates to firms that are 
(completely) unable to adapt to their environment, firms belonging to EBFP 4 refers to firms that 
have inadequately adapted to their environment.
Finally, the reasons for the failure of badly-managed firms (EBFP 5) are mainly endogenous to the 
firm : they are related to (internal) deficiencies in managerial competences. Nevertheless, EBFP 5 is 
very large and it needs to be refined in a future research.
4. Discussion 
4.1. Two fundamental dimensions explaining small business failure
The present quantitative study stresses two other dimensions that fundamentally explain the failure 
of small firms : the endogenous versus exogenous nature of the explanatory failure factors and 
the firm's ability to adapt to its environment. 
26 Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that, as mentioned in Paper 3, the pattern which refers to shocked firms has to 
be relativized. As Ooghe and Waeyaert (2004) argue, even if one (or several) shock was presented as the 
fundamental reason for the failure of his firms by the entrepreneur, the failure of “shocked firms” can often be 
attributed to other more fundamental explanatory factors such as an insufficient preparation of the founder's 
succession, for example. In other words, in some cases, some unfavorable (internal) conditions are already 
developing within the firm before the occurrence of the shock.
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First, firms may fail because of endogenous factors such as insufficient competences within the 
firms  or  because  of  exogenous  factors  such  as  a  private  problem.  This  distinction  between 
endogenous  and  exogenous  failure  factors  is  consistent  with  previous  literature.  Actually,  a 
discrimination between these two kinds of failure factors is traditionally presented in the literature 
(Newton,  1985;  Hall  and Young, 1991; Sheldon,  1994;  Liefooghe,  1997;  Ooghe and Waeyaert, 
2004)
Second, the firm's ability to adapt to its environment is strongly associated with small business 
failure. The ability of the entrepreneurs to analyze their environment, to anticipate events and to 
adapt firms to them (adequately) are thus essential factors for their success and their firm's survival 
because they guarantee a better fit between the organization and its environment (O'Connor, 1994; 
Stoeberl et al., 1994). 
Consistent with previous literature, two main kinds of problems related to the firm's ability to adapt 
to its environment are pointed out by the present study. 
 At first, the absence of flexibility of the firm such as presented in “apathetic firms” (EBFP 
3) may explain its failure. Indeed, the survival and continuing prosperity of an organization 
depends on its ability to remain flexible and responsive to changes in its own performance 
levels  as  well  as  in  its  environment  (Kisfalvi,  2000).  If  the  entrepreneurs  loose  their 
dynamism and do not anticipate and adapt to (progressive) change in their environment, the 
firm will progressively loose touch with the external world and it will no more be able to 
maintain a viable strategic position. 
 In contrast, even if it may sometimes have a positive impact on the firm (Delacroix and 
Swaminathan, 1991), the implementation of an strategic or organizational change, such as 
presented in EBFP 4, may also explain business failure. Indeed, the implementation of a 
decision, or change, that is founded on an inadequate analysis of the environment leads to 
problems of fitness between the firm and its environment and, in a deterministic perspective, 
to failure.
4.2. Consistency with previous literature
Even if none of the previous studies focuses on small businesses, Table 4 shows that a large part of 
the results of this study are consistent with the explanatory failure patterns emerging from previous 
literature . 
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Table 4 : Relationship between the results of this study and previous literature
Indeed, EBFPs 1 3 and 5 have been discussed by previous researchers. So, these patterns do not 
seem to be specific to small business failures.
Nevertheless, the present research provides some interesting new insights.
First,  two original EBFPs are highlighted by the current analysis.  On the one hand, EBFP 2 is 
dedicated to firms which serve other interests while none of the previous nine studies on EBFPs 
deals with this frequent business problem (Newton, 1985). On the other hand, an original pattern is 
underlined by the statistical analyses : “firms that fail after a punctual managerial error” (EBFP 4). 
Even if it does not provide a complete and definitive explanation of this new failure pattern, the 
present analysis proposes some first insights about it. A priori, it seems that this EBFP relates to 
firms that fail  because of a punctual  managerial  error which is  related to  the (in)ability of the 
entrepreneur to correctly analyze the firm's environment, to anticipate changes and to adapt the firm 
to them. A punctual managerial decision (such as a strategic reorientation or a big investment) that 
does  not  have  the  expected  consequences  or  an  inadequate  business  plan  are  the  punctual 
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managerial errors that are stressed by the present study.
Second, the taxonomy induced by the present analysis focuses on small firms and on their specific 
characteristics.  As  a  consequence,  some  failure  (sub)patterns  are  particularly  related  to  small 
business failures. For example, shocked firms should be much more common among a sample of 
small distressed firms than among a sample of larger ones because their resource set is smaller and 
it should thus much more rapidly be affected by a shock. Similarly, a private disorder or problems 
related to founder's succession can explain the failure of a small firm but they will rarely cause the 
failure of a large firm.
The results of this analysis are not only consistent with the eight previous studies about explanatory 
business failure patterns presented in Section 1 but they are also coherent, to a larger extend, with 
other studies from the literature on business failure. So, the basic ideas underlying each pattern were 
already tackled in previous research about business failure.
 Referring to EBFP 1, Hall (1992) or Everett and Watson (1997) emphasize the danger of 
external shocks, which come from the macroeconomic or from the competitive environment 
of the firm. Grusky (1962), Brown (1982), Haveman (1993), Pailot (1999) or Haveman and 
Khaire (2004) present a series of potential failure factors related to the takeover of a firm. 
Finally, Smallbone (1990) mentions that private problems may originate business failure.
 Concerning EBFP 2, Hall  and Young (1991), Newton (1985) or Jaminon (1986) remind 
conflicting interests may explain a business failure. In addition, Kellens (1993) and Ooghe 
and Waeyaert (2004) underline that entrepreneurs who only serve their personal enrichment 
or who have fraudulent activities inevitably provoke the failure of their firm.
 Referring to EBFP 3, a lot of previous researchers stress the problems faced by nonreactive 
old  firms.  O'Connor  (1994),  Ranger-Moore  (1997),  Henderson  (1999),  Sull  (1999)  or 
Kisfalvi (2000) are examples of researchers who underline the importance to remain flexible 
and responsive to changes.
 Concerning  EBFP  4,  previous  researchers  already  underline  that  the  inability  of  the 
entrepreneur to correctly analyze the firm's environment, to anticipate changes and to adapt 
the firm to them can be at the origins of its failure (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988, Thornhill 
and Amit, 2003). In particular, a lot of them, such as Castrogiovanni (1996) or Perry (2001), 
stress the importance of making an adequate business plan before launching a firm and the 
high  risk  of  failure  if  this  latter  is  not  carefully  elaborated.  Furthermore,  a  punctual 
managerial error (such as a missed strategic reorientation or a big risky investment) has also 
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been presented as a potential cause of failure by Argenti (1976) or Ooghe and Waeyaert 
(2004)
 Finally,  referring  to  EBFP  5, “poor  management  competences”,  such  as  managerial 
incompetence or insufficiencies (Larson and Clute, 1979), are by far the most commonly 
cited reasons for small business failure in the literature (Peterson et al., 1983; Wichman, 
1983; O'Neill and Duker, 1986; Haswell and Holmes, 1989). 
Nevertheless, this popular statement made in the literature is very vague and can include a lot of 
diverse problems in the management of the small firm. That is why, as mentioned early, this last 
EBFP needs to be refined in a future research.
Conclusion
Based on a cluster analysis and a correspondence analysis applied to data collected directly from a 
sample of 208 small distressed firms placed under follow-up by a Court of Commerce,  this paper 
inducesfive explanatory businss failure patterns amongst small distressed firms. 
EBFP 1 Shocked firms hurted by an abrupt event
EBFP 2 Firms serving other interests than the pure corporate one
EBFP 3 Apathetic firms that are unable to compete in a turbulent environment
EBFP 4 Firms that fail because of a punctual managerial error
EBFP 5 Recurrently badly-managed firms
Table 5:  Five main EBFPs
While these results bring new lights on why small firms fail, information remains still to be learned 
about business failure, especially in small firms. The current study suggests then new avenues for 
research  about this phenomenon.  
First,  as  the failure  of (young)  innovative firms appears  to  behave like an outlier,  it  would be 
interesting  to  investigate  this  kind  of  firms  and,  in  particular,  to  concentrate  on  a  better 
understanding of the reasons for their failure.
Second,  a  further  investigation  of  EBFP 4,  dedicated  to  small  firms  that  fail  after  a  punctual 
managerial error, and of EBFP 5, dedicated to recurrently badly-managed firms, would be necessary 
to understand the true origin of these errors and to correct them (for example by adapting legal 
requirements in terms of education and background experience before launching a new venture). 
Third,  the  present  paper  still  does  not  integrate  the  organizational  and  financial  approaches  of 
business failure. Especially, it  would be interesting to determine if firms belonging to the same 
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EBFP have  a  similar  behavior  in  terms  of  financial  ratios  and,  thus,  to  check if  firms  can  be 
associated to one specific EBFP on the basis of publicly available data, i.e. financial information 
published in the annual accounts. If each EBFP leads to specific financial symptoms, it would thus 
be possible to have an idea about the fundamental problems of failure without having any access to 
internal information. In a preventive perspective to failure, this would be very useful because it 
would notably facilitate the work of the Court as well as the identification of key problems before 
the elaboration of a recovery plan.
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